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Abstract 
This paper examines the determinants of output growth differentials from set 
convergence criteria in a panel of West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) states. 
Drawing largely from micro-founded models, rooted in New Keynesian traditions, the 
study shows that widespread divergence of output growth rates of participating 
countries from ideal benchmarks calls to question the ability of independent monetary 
and exchange rates policy as instruments of national/regional macroeconomic 
stabilization, the preconditions for unionization.  Using a stylized 5-country model of 
WAMZ area, the differences in national output growth/demand is analyzed in the light 
of country specific shocks or differences in the monetary transmission mechanisms.  
The main results show that business cycles (output shocks) stabilization around a 
desired target was not attained.  Over the sample period, the un-weighted average 
regional GDP growth rates were very slow, vary widely among the countries and 
responded very poorly to independent monetary policy stance. The strong output growth 
rates divergence among these countries suggest a reconsideration of output convergence 
as pre-condition for unionization.  
 
Keywords:  Growth rates differentials, Output convergence, exchange rate, WAMZ 
members, and panel data   
  
JEL: E31, F41.   
1.   Introduction 
One of the conditionality for the commencement of WAMZ draws extensively 
from the convergence hypothesis which postulates that costs associated with 
unionization can be minimized if the differences in spatial distribution of income and 
opportunities between intending members at the international and national levels can be 
narrowed down or eliminated.  Barro & Sala-i-Martin (2004) gave a two-fold definition 
of such convergence: firstly, they defined economic convergence as the narrowing of 
output gap between less developed and developed economies which accompanies 
international trade.  The neoclassical growth model describes this as absolute or 
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conditional β convergence if the economies have similar tastes and technologies, 
thereby converging to the same or their own steady state.   Benos & Karagianis (2008) 
notes that a second form of economic convergence occurs if the dispersion of the cross -
sectional distribution of a variable such as per capita income (measured, for example, by 
its standard deviation across a group of countries/regions) declines over time (σ 
convergence).  Although Corsetti (2008) acknowledges the desirability of economic 
heterogeneity (especially one generated by sustainable policy pursuits), he argues that 
such could be inconsequential if independent national policy pursuits interfere adversely 
with regional macroeconomic stabilization around desired growth path.  
 The observation, since the commencement of WAMZ in 2000 is that this 
primary condition has been the most difficult to fulfill.  Not only has there been 
persistent divergence in output growth rates among these countries, the prospect for 
attaining its convergence has also been weak thereby deeming commencement prospect 
also.  If progress is to be made towards convergence, there is therefore the need to 
understand what generates the differential growth path among these countries.  In 
particular, there is the need to ascertain the role of nominal exchange rates volatility 
(appreciation/depreciation), under independent floating exchange rate regime as well as 
the independent monetary policy stance in stimulating growth in these countries.   The 
objective of this study therefore is to ascertain the determinants or factors giving rise to 
these differences in the light of historical differences in independent monetary policy 
pursuits.  
2. Related Literatures 
Several studies examine regional income convergence and its determinants 
globally from a macroeconomic perspective.  At the policy level, regional convergence 
has been an objective of most governments all over the world and particularly in Europe 
since its inception as the European Economic Union (EEC) in 1957. Proponents of the 
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European common markets argued that lower regional inequality is necessary in order 
for European Monetary Union (EMU) to be successful. However, the international 
evidence is mixed. For example, Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1991) have documented 
convergence at an approximate annual rate of 2% in the US states/regions for 1880–
1988 and 73 EU regions for 1950–1985.  In a recent study they found very weak 
evidence to support the theoretical assertion that migration from poor to rich economies 
fosters convergence (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2004).  Furthermore, Chessire-Carbonaro 
(1995) reported mixed results for 122 urban EU regions. Recently, J.R Cuadrado-Roura 
(2001) found that after a period of regional convergence from 1960 to the mid-1970s, 
the process stopped and stabilized until 1996 in the EU regions.   Benos & Karagianis 
(2008) notes that economic convergence occurs if the dispersion of the cross-sectional 
distribution of a variable such as per capita income (measured, for example, by its 
standard deviation across a group of countries/regions) declines over time (σ 
convergence).   
 Several new empirical literatures also emerged on the subject of output supply 
shocks especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s when the debate on similarities of 
shocks -- i.e. the extent by which partner countries intending to adopt a single currency 
endure symmetric versus asymmetric shocks -- acquired great prominence. This was the 
result of advancements in econometric techniques by Blanchard and Quah (1989) and 
other authors. The main underlying argument posit that if the incidence of supply and 
demand shocks and the speed with which the economy adjusts – taking into 
consideration also the policy responses to shocks – are similar across partner countries, 
then the need for policy autonomy is reduced and the net benefits from adopting a single 
currency might be higher. Hence, the similarity of shocks, and policy responses to 
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shocks was perceived as a “catch all” property capturing the interaction between several 
OCA properties (Masson and Pattillo, 2004).  
Among the studies that examine the incidences of supply shocks are: Blanchard 
and Quah (1989), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992, and 1993).  These studies estimate 
vector auto-regressions for output and prices; restricting demand disturbances to effect 
on only prices in the long run while allowing supply disturbances to have long-run 
effects on both prices and output. In particular, they find positive correlations between 
the fundamental shocks in Austria, Germany, Denmark, France, the Benelux countries 
and Switzerland, while the correlation between these countries and the southern 
countries is weaker.  
At the continental level, Buigut, and Valev (2004) estimated a two variable 
VAR model to identify supply and demand shocks for East African countries in order to 
determine if they are good candidates for a monetary union. Their analysis shows that 
contemporaneous shocks among the EA countries are mostly asymmetric with the 
exception of Kenya and Burundi that was positive and significantly correlated.   
At the ECOWAS regional level, Fielding and Shields (2001) estimated an output 
and price shocks for CFA franc countries using a 4-variable (output growth, inflation, 
money growth and foreign inflation) VAR model to confirm a high degree of 
correlation between inflation shocks across countries.  Fielding and Shields (2003) 
extend this study to WAMZ using a 3-variable (output growth, real exchange rate and 
money growth) VAR model and the terms of trade as an exogenous variable. The results 
suggest less real exchange rate volatilities for WAMZ countries and negative output 
shocks correlation, although the latter result is not significant.  Houssa and Leuven 
(2004) analyzed the costs of a monetary union in West Africa by means of asymmetric 
aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks but departed from previous studies that 
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estimated the shocks with the VAR model.  Instead, they discussed the limitations of the 
VAR model approach and apply a new technique based on the dynamic factor model.  
The results suggest the presence of economic costs for a monetary union in West Africa 
because aggregate supply shocks are poorly correlated or asymmetric across these 
countries.  Although their studies also show that aggregate demand shocks are 
correlated between West African countries, their analysis also returned a verdict that it 
would not be an optimal policy choice to commence a monetary union for the region.   
Also, Masson and Pattillo (2004) applied an “Augmented OCA Model with 
Fiscal Distortions” to evaluate the feasibility of a monetary union for Africa. It is based 
on the optimum currency area literature, which focuses on asymmetries of shocks, but 
further identifies another important asymmetry: fiscal distortions, under the assumption 
that the regional central bank is assumed not to be fully independent, but sets monetary 
policy to reflect average conditions (including fiscal deficits) in the region. As a result, 
countries that were very different with respect to fiscal distortion would be unattractive 
partners for a monetary union, because the central bank would produce undesirable 
outcomes for one or both of them.  In this particular study, Nigeria was identified as an 
unattractive partner for the WAMZ monetary union, while suggesting selective 
accession to existing monetary union by intending members of this union to the 
WAEMU.  
 The major criticisms of the shocking studies are that the test results are 
ambiguous (Tavlas, 1994), and often in conflict (with no concurrence on its theoretical 
underpinning, e.g., on the relationship between exchange rate variability, trade and 
investment); De Grauwe (1990) observed the difficulty in constructing measures of 
future shocks.  Mongelli (2002) noted that the shocking measures does not take into 
account the Lucas critique and the changes in structures due to changes in policy 
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regimes, such as a “disciplining effect” on policy-makers as well as the effects of 
market liberalization.  These studies also lead to the drawing of narrower borders for 
monetary integration, i.e., the "core group,” than other type of studies. Due to the need 
for relatively long time series for econometric tests, these studies cannot reflect a 
progress under some properties, such as a change in policy preferences accompanying a 
fall in inflation differentials, in the more recent part of the sample period.   
 A recent study by Corsetti (2008), therefore suggest a reconsideration of output 
shocks criteria from the perspective of new Keynesians monetary theory that indeed, 
output shocks divergence under inefficient independent monetary policy should actually 
signaled the need for putting in place an overriding supra-national monetary policy 
controls that can remove the autonomy from national monetary authorities.  While he 
acknowledges the desirability of economic heterogeneity (especially one generated by 
sustainable policy pursuits), he argues that such could be inconsequential if independent 
national policy pursuits interfere adversely with regional macroeconomic stabilization 
around desired growth path. 
3. Theoretical Framework and Analytical Model 
For the purpose of this study, I lean towards Corsetti (2008) that analyzed 
monetary stabilization policies from a Neo-Keynesian perspective.  Corsetti (2008) uses 
a new micro-founded model of the costs of adopting common currency, relative to an 
ideal benchmark in which domestic monetary authorities pursue country specific 
efficient stabilizations that encompass both demand and supply stabilization.  The 
analytical framework is premised on the assumption of a closed economy populated by 
identical households, who derive utility from consumption of goods and leisure, i.e. 
their utility is decreasing in labour effort.  In the tradition of macroeconomic models, 
especially as in many modern contributions to monetary theory, he posits that aggregate 
demand coincides with consumption expenditure, i.e. abstract from investment and 
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government spending.  From the demand side, Corsetti (2008) argues that if C denote 
aggregate consumption, and P its price (or CPI), then nominal aggregate demand is thus 
given by PC, and real domestic output YH coincides with real consumption expenditure, 
i.e. C = YH.  Corsetti (2008) therefore related aggregate demand PC to a variable µ , 
which indexes the stance of monetary policy: a higher µ means that monetary 
authorities pursue expansionary policies, raising aggregate demand and thus nominal 
consumption.  Corsetti (2008) therefore hypothesize that the dynamic aggregate demand 
in nominal terms which reflects optimal consumption and savings decisions by 
households can be written as follows: 
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Where β  is the discount factor reflecting consumers’ impatience, E denotes 
expectations of future variables and the equation makes it clear that, for given 
expectations of future prices and future real demand, current spending (corresponding to 
the current monetary stance) µ  is decreasing in the nominal interest. 
 From the supply side, Corsetti (2008) assumes that output is produced in many 
varieties by specialized small firms with monopoly power  and characterized by 
production function such that: ,lHH ZY =  where HZ  denotes the level of productivity, 
identical across firms, l denotes employment under the assumption that HZ  vary 
randomly at business cycle frequency.  He further assumes that if firms face demand for 
output that is constant price elastic and preset prices which maximizes their market 
value, such that it results from charging the equilibrium markup over expected marginal 
costs, the following equilibrium conditions obtains:  
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Where the marginal costs HMC , the nominal wage divide by productivity and the 
equilibrium markup mkp is a decreasing function of the elasticity of substitution.  As the 
price is fixed over the production period, the (ex-post) realized markup will vary 
inversely with marginal costs.  Corsetti (2008) assumes that labour market is 
competitive and varies proportionally with the monetary stance µ  and linking both 
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Abstracting from Eq. 7, Corsetti (2008) characterized the natural rate of employment 
(output) if all prices were flexible (i.e. in the absence of nominal rigidities) by assuming 
that each firm would maximize current profit by charging the equilibrium markup over 
current marginal costs: 
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Substituting the definition of µ , the production function ,lHH ZY =  and re-arranging, 
yields the result that the natural level of employment (output), nrl , is constant: 
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In the long run, nrl  is a decreasing function given the monopoly of domestic firms and 
as goods become better substitutes, or regulation and competition policy reduces the 
average markups in the economy, the natural rate of employment and output rise.  At 
business cycle frequencies, the natural rate of output fluctuates with productivity, i. e. 
nr
H
nr
H ZY l= . 
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For an efficient monetary stabilization, Corsetti (2008) examined the 
macroeconomic implications of random fluctuations in current and future productivity, 
and optimal policy response to stabilize the economy (demand shocks). .  He therefore 
argued that holding monetary stance µ  (hence nominal wages) fixed, a positive 
productivity shock (an increase in HZ ) lowers marginal cost ex post. But if prices are 
preset, firms cannot take advantage of higher productivity to lower prices and raise 
output: a fixed µ  implies that aggregate demand is also fixed in nominal and real terms.  
As a result firms satisfy current demand using less productive inputs, while the positive 
productivity shocks opens a positive output gap: employment and output fall short of 
their natural rate, i.e., their equilibrium value in a flexible price allocation.  
 In response to an unexpected increase in productivity, monetary authorities can 
improve welfare by expanding aggregate demand via expansionary stance (in the case 
of positive shocks (and contracting it in response to a negative shock, as to rule out 
over-heating and excess employment).  This it can do by setting monetary policy such 
that nominal marginal costs are constant during the period: 
 )6.(Eq
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If the above holds, i.e. if private agents expect the central bank to credibly pursue rules 
such that τµ HZ= , optimal prices would remain constant in nominal terms also in the 
absence of nominal rigidities as there would be no difference between the Eq. 7 and Eq. 
9.  Thus, a monetary rule that satisfies this condition make nominal rigidities 
inconsequential, in that the sticky price allocation coincides with the flex-price 
allocation and the economy operates at a natural rate.  Corsetti (2008) observed that Eq. 
11 requires a central bank to commit to (a) align aggregate demand and (b) keep the 
price level along the predetermined path, indexed byτ .   
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 With regard to interest rates and demand stabilization, Corsetti (2008) noted that 
traditional models of stabilization would require central banks to pursue interest rates 
policy corresponding to the optimal stabilization policy by substituting Eq. 11 into the 
dynamic demand equation, that is: 
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He then derived the interest rate corresponding to the implementation of the optimal 
stabilization policy as: 
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Corsetti (2008) concludes from this expression that given the path of price levels τ to 
which a central bank commits when it defines inflation targets at different horizon, and 
holding expectation of future productivity constant, the natural rate of interest falls with 
current productivity gains – which, in the absence of a contingent optimal reaction by 
monetary authorities, would open a positive output gap that rises with anticipated 
productivity growth.  He further maintains that the need to promote a non-inflationary 
growth as in the condition in Eq. 11 would require that monetary authorities not only 
respond to current productivity shocks, but also to current aggregate demand 
disturbances.  
 Against this framework, Corsetti (2008) analyzed and compared the costs of 
losing monetary autonomy when it translates into insufficient stabilization of national 
business cycles to the apparent noise generated by subscribing to a common monetary 
policy rules.  He characterized the main inefficiencies from insufficient stabilization in 
terms of relative price distortions, which translates into suboptimal level of output and 
consumption.  He therefore argued that if the central bank does not stabilize marginal 
costs completely, demand does not fall optimally when productivity is low.  With preset 
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prices, these turn out to be too high relative to factor costs, and firms supply too much 
relative to the flex-price level of output, and vice versa.   He therefore concludes that a 
highly unstable monetary policy could potentially produce large welfare losses, up to 
dwarfing the costs of insufficient stabilization.   
 Corsetti (2008) introduced trade and international interdependence into the 
model via nominal exchange rates under the assumption that growth rates of marginal 
utilities are equalized across countries in Purchasing Power Parity.  He argues that if the 
two countries involved in trade are perfectly symmetric ex ante, it means that wealth 
and consumption are always equalized in nominal terms across countries.  This implies 
that exchange rate depends on both home and foreign monetary stance.  He concludes 
that a commitment to a monetary union (in which the two countries adopt a common 
currency or irrevocably pegged exchange rates offer a least cost than two national 
monetary authorities acting independently or even under an international monetary 
policy coordination but which yields undesirable results.   
Analytical Model 
Since price stabilization around the optimal path is not the only objective of 
monetary policy of the WAMZ countries in the light of rigidities which inhibits the 
capacity of factor prices such as interest and exchange rates from performing effectively 
expenditure switching transmission mechanism, I lean towards Corsetti (2008), that 
monetary policy stance can also give rise to welfare losses due to insufficient 
stabilization derived from the case in which domestic productivity shocks are purely 
idiosyncratic.   
I abstract from equation 6: 
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To note that productivity shocks in the context of its convergence to regional 
benchmarks would reflect the condition that 
)7.( aEqZ H LLLLLτµ =   
Whereby µ is the productivity shocks, ZH is the expectation that macroeconomic stance 
would keep prices constant, while τ  is a vector of aggregate monetary stabilization 
stance.  This suggests a reformulation of the effect of monetary policy stance on 
productivity shocks or output gaps as a measure of output dispersion such that: 
)8.(1 EqyZ ititHtit LLLελτϑµ +++= −  
Where redefine the vector as:  ],,,,[ 21 itititit iCGCPMNER −∆=τ where 1−∆ itNER  is the 
lagged change in nominal exchange rate of the national currencies to the US $, their 
dominant reserve currency;  2M is money supply, which is an important component 
of independent monetary policy targets of WAMZ countries, in the light of the use of 
both reserve and interest rates operating procedures, itCP  and itCG  represents banking 
sector credit to private and government sectors respectively, to capture the loose stand 
of monetary policy with regard to government borrowing and the extent of bias it 
implies for private sector credit; iti  denotes the overall interest rate policy stance of the 
monetary authorities, represented in this model by the monetary policy rate or minimum 
rediscount rates and finally yit the initial level of real output growth gap.  This gives us 
the following empirical specification:  
)9.(162543211 EqyiMCGCPNER ititititititittit ελααααpiααϑµ +++++++∆+= −−  
Where both the dependent and explanatory variables are as defined earlier, while tϑ  
refers to the fixed effects constants of the pooled regression equation.  All theα s are the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables of the model, while λ  represents the 
coefficient of the lagged value of output gap.   
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 The expectation of the coefficient of nominal exchange rate in Eq. 9 1α  is 
neutral since a home nominal depreciation following a home monetary expansion has 
no expenditure switching effects, but can potentially worsens terms of trade in favour of 
the foreign partner in trade. It can be potentially harmful if the foreign exchange content 
of domestic production is very high.  On the other hand, 2α  is expected to be negative, 
since higher widening gap of inflation from desired level could lead to higher costs of 
production and consequently lower output.    3α  is likely to be positive, as expansion in 
credit to the private sector is expected to lead to output expansion (a positive shock) and 
therefore contributes to higher growth in output. 4α  is likely to be negative, if the 
potential goal of macroeconomic stabilization is to reduce the gap between consumption 
and its efficient level, which may vary with time depending on the state of the economy.  
Credit to government and especially monetary authorities borrowing from the public 
through public debt instruments as part of monetary control measures can critically 
stifle credit to the private sector, with a crowding out effect and adverse effect on 
output.  5α  is likely to be negative if an expansionary monetary stance originates from 
fiscal indiscipline, weak monetary authorities that lacks autonomy to restrain fiscal 
authorities or from inability of the monetary authority to adopt an appropriate monetary 
framework in the face of deep internal economic distortions. This would generally have 
adverse effects on output.  6α  is expected to be negative, in line with Corsetti’s (2008) 
argument that given the path which monetary authorities commit when it defines 
inflation targets at different horizon, and holding expectation of future productivity 
constant, the natural rate of interest falls with current productivity gains.  This could 
potentially open a positive output gap in the absence of a contingent optimal reaction by 
the monetary authorities, which rises with anticipated productivity growth. The sign of 
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Dep. Variable: Real GDP, yit  
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section SUR)
Coeff. Coeff.
Name Symbol Coeff. Value t-Stat. Prob  Value t-Stat. Prob.  
Constant 3.47 1.2 0.24 426.8 0.5 0.65
Nom.ER App/Dep. ∆NERit-1 α 1 -0.00093 -0.4 0.66 -4.7 -1.9 0.06
Inflation Divergence α2 -0.0296 -3.3 0.00 -7.6 -1.4 0.16
Credit to Pr. Sect. Cpit(-1) α3
Credit to Govt. CGit(-2) α4 6.69E-07 3.8 0.00 -0.0024 -14.8 0.00
Money Supply: M2(-1) α5 5.21E-07 4.7 0.00 0.0030 19.5 0.00
Monetary Policy Rate Log iit α6 -0.268 -2.3 0.02 -268.6 -4.0 0.00
Lagged Aggr. Output  (GDP) yit-1(-2) -0.873 -2.4 0.02 1058.3 9.9 0.00
_GAM--C -1.72 -5471.1
_GHA--C 0.92 -3244.0
_GUI--C -0.09 -6874.4
_NIG--C 1.96 20942.2
_SLN--C -1.08 -5352.6
R-squared 0.157 0.988
Adjusted R-squared 0.131 0.987
S.E. of regression 0.987 0.803
F-statistic 5.954 2568.9
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0
Mean dependent var -2.6 5.6
S.D. dependent var 3.1 4.5
Sum squared resid 310.5 205.7
Durbin-Watson stat 1.1 0.3
a. 
 µ it   b.    yit
Statistics
Dep. Variables 
Weighted Statistics
Independent Variables Statistics
Fixed Effects (Cross)
Table 1: Pooled Single Equation Regression Results
 for thePartial Effects of Monetary and Exchange
 Rate Policy on WAMZ Output (Eqation 3.14)
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
 tϑ
itpi
 
λ
tϑ
λ  is expected to be negative as lower past values of output level is likely to be 
associated with higher output gap.  
4. Empirical Results 
The regression results of Equation 9 which is the estimates of the partial effects 
of national monetary and exchange rate policy stance on production shocks asymmetry 
among participating countries in WAMZ is presented in Table 1.  Two sets of equations 
were estimated.  The first estimated the effect of monetary policy instruments on output 
gap, measured by the extent of divergence between the national growth targets and 
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attainment, denoted by tµ .  The second evaluated the relative effectiveness of 
independent monetary and exchange rates policy on national economic performance, 
measured by the real Gross Domestic Product denoted by ty .    The adjusted R-squared 
of the regression results of tµ  dependent equation (see table 1a) is very low, suggesting  
Figure 1: Trends in Real GDP Growth Rates of WAMZ Countries, 1991 - 2007 
that independent monetary and exchange rate policy pursuits explained less than 15 per 
cent of the pervasive output shocks within the WAMZ in the study period.  A plot of the 
growth rates in a stacked graph as shown by Figure 7 suggests very strong business 
cycles asymmetry.  Aggregate economic performance vacillated very widely around 
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Figure 2: Real GDP of WAMZ Countries at 2001Constant
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stagnation, with a good number of the countries recording declining growths, while 
most had never attained up to 5 per cent growth rates.  The descriptive statistics 
associated with this 
graph is as shown in 
Table 2.  The statistics 
shows that mean average 
growth rates ranged from 
as low as 2.2 per cent for 
Sierra Leone to about 6.6 
per cent for Guinea.   
Gambia, Ghana and 
Sierra Leone had records of minimum growth rates that were negative, while Guinea 
output was most volatile ranging from a minimum of 0.9 per cent to a maximum of 
190.4 percent.  In general, these countries are characterized by slow growth rates.  
Another important source 
of asymmetry is the 
relative size of 
participating countries in 
the real aggregate demand 
of the region.  Figure 2 
shows that Nigeria 
accounts for a significant 
proportion of the output 
WAMZ (approximately 
80 per cent). 
Gambia Ghana Guinea Nigeria S/Leone
 Mean 4.0 3.8 6.6 4.1 2.2
 Median 4.7 4.3 4.2 3.7 3.7
 Maximum 9.3 7.0 190.4 26.9 30.4
 Minimum -4.2 -4.3 0.9 0.0 -20.3
 Std. Dev. 2.9 2.7 22.8 3.3 11.4
 Skewness -1.2 -1.5 7.9 5.1 0.1
 Kurtosis 4.8 5.1 64.4 36.5 3.2
 Jarque-Bera 24.9 37.2 11217.4 3435.2 0.2
 Probability 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9
 Sum 266.4 251.4 444.5 275.0 147.6
 Sum Sq. Dev. 537.2 473.8 34445.1 702.8 8515.2
 Observations 67 67 67 67 67
1991Q1 to 2007Q4 %)
Source: Estimated with Eviews 6.1 from the Regression Data
Table 2: WAMZ Real GDP Growth Descriptive Statistics,
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The overall estimate of the fixed effects constant, tϑ , for both equations of Table 
2 are not significant, but also reflects very significant variation in its value across the 
participating countries in WAMZ. Whereas, it exhibited a negative spread from the 
regional average in all the other countries, it posted a positive average for Nigeria.  This 
finding tends to confirm that there is a wide divergence among the participants with 
regard to the average outcomes of macroeconomic stabilization efforts, with a higher 
disproportionate weight in favour of Nigeria that is obviously an outlier of the proposed 
convergence club.  This implies that pursuits of a less than optimal macroeconomic 
stabilization policy could have very negative spillover effects on efforts towards 
convergence.  The trend in National Real GDP displayed in Figure 2 shows the 
divergent growth path which tended to accentuate these asymmetries.   
The coefficient, 1α , of exchange rate devaluation, 1−∆ itNER , is not significant as 
a determinant of demand/output shocks within WAMZ in equation 1a, but exhibited an 
inverse relationship to aggregate output at about 6% confidence level.  This result tends 
to suggest that the production and asymmetric shocks experienced by these countries is 
not caused by exchange rate devaluation.   This is expected, since as a group of small 
countries, with non-tradable currencies, both export and import prices are preset in 
foreign traded currencies.  As such, exchange rates movements do not necessarily 
perform the expenditure switching stabilization roles envisioned by traditional theory.   
Instead, exchange rate devaluation translates into higher costs of imported inputs and 
consumer goods.  The magnitude of these costs can be very high if the foreign resource 
content of domestic production and consumption is also very high, and economic 
activity is dominated by non-tradable and primary commodities export.  This assertion 
is consistent with regression results of Table 1b, which shows that 1% devaluation can 
potentially lead to about 4.7% decline in output.    
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  On the other hand,  the coefficient, 2α , of inflation divergence variable, itpi  is 
negative and significant in the regression results of Table 1a, confirming the expectation 
that higher widening gap of inflation from desired level could lead to higher costs of 
production and consequently lower output.  Although the t-statistics of 1b results show 
that inflation is not a significant determinant of aggregate output in WAMZ, it exhibited 
a negative relationship confirming the earlier assertion.   
The performance of credit to the private sector variable, itCp , in the estimated 
equations was poor, and had to be eliminated from the regression, while the estimate of 
the coefficient, 4α , of the credit to government, itCG ,  is significant and correctly 
signed but inelastic in both equations.  The positive sign of this coefficient in 1a 
suggests that credit to government, especially through the issue of public debt 
instruments as part of monetary control measures can critically stifle credit to private 
sector via a crowding out effect with adverse consequence on output performance.   
The coefficient, 5α , of the money supply variable, 2M , is significant, positive 
but inelastic, in line with New Keynesian stance that expansionary monetary stance can 
spur limited growth when economies operate at less than full employment capacity. 
This is most likely the case, given the slow growth rates, and inelastic supply which 
characterize these countries.  However, the inelastic outcome of this coefficient points 
to the weakness of using reserve control via monetary targets as an instrument for 
promoting growth.   
The coefficient, 6α , of monetary policy rate, iti , is significant and exhibit the 
correct sign.  This is consistent with the literature (Corsetti, 2008) that given the path 
which monetary authorities commit when it defines inflation targets at different horizon, 
and holding expectation of future productivity constant, the natural rate of interest falls 
with current productivity gains.  This could potentially open a positive output gap in the 
 19
absence of a contingent optimal reaction by the monetary authorities, which rises with 
anticipated productivity growth.  
The coefficient estimate, λ , of lagged aggregate output variable, 2−ity  is 
significant and have the right signs in both equations.  The negative sign of this 
coefficient in 1a is consistent with theoretical expectation that lower past values of 
output level is likely to be associated with higher output gap.  The finding that past 
trends in output is the major determinant of current output performance is remarkable.  
This implies that monetary policy pursuits, in the face of nominal and structural 
rigidities play insignificant role in demand/output stimulation.  Instead, trend in 
business cycles and output tended to follow the natural rate path which fluctuates with 
productivity along the production possibility frontiers. 
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
This study presents an alternative reconsideration of traditional Optimum 
Currency Areas (OCA) macroeconomic convergence criteria as options for WAMZ 
commencement, in the light of recent advancements in monetary theory.  It presents 
micro-founded models, rooted in New Keynesian traditions to show that tests 
confirming widespread divergence from ideal macroeconomic benchmarks with 
unsustainable independent monetary and exchange rates pursuits are more appropriate 
evaluating criterion for WAMZ instead of output convergence.  
 The results show that substantial macroeconomic costs have been associated 
with monetary autonomy reflected in the wide divergence of outcomes from set 
benchmarks, with very little prospect for moving towards macroeconomic convergence 
in the absence of internationally binding monetary policy coordination framework.   
Indeed, it was established that given the ex ante independent fiscal and monetary policy 
pursuits of each of the participating country, there is the likelihood that not more than 
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two countries can meet output convergence criterion, suggesting that the 
commencement date could remain indeterminate.  This result also show that alternative 
empirical tests of OCA can further be explored to lend credence to this new perspective 
of output shocks implication.   
In conclusion, it is desirable to note that the relative ineffectiveness of 
independent monetary and exchange rates policies stemmed in part from the lack of 
political autonomy of the national monetary authorities (the central banks, which 
hitherto led to a compromising stance with respect to its choice of instruments for 
monetary controls) and partly to inappropriate choice of instruments, with inherent bias 
against growth, but laying very strong foundation for inflationary spiral.  It does appear 
that under this macroeconomic environment, there is little prospect for improvement 
except some alternative actions are taken to overcome the overbearing political 
influence.  
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